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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is taken from the trial court's final order and judgment of June 8, 
2007. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2a-3(j). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Must the Appellee Swanson have an interest in the subject property to 
have standing to contest the validity of the Appellant Victor's lien? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a given individual or 
association has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law, 
although there may be factual findings that bear on the issue, an appellate court will 
review a question of law for correctness. Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson, 946 
P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). An appellate court will review such factual 
determinations made by a trial court with deference. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 
935-36 (Utah 1994). Because of the important policy considerations involved in 
granting or denying standing, an appellate court will closely review trial court 
determinations of whether a given set of facts fits the legal requirements for standing, 
granting minimal discretion to the trial court. Id. at 938, 939. 
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant Victor raised and argued the issue 
of Swanson's standing before the court below. R.227; R. 322. As well, unless a party 
1 
has standing a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute. A lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. See Barnard v. Wassermann. 
855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah 1983). "[Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must 
be satisfied" before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties. Wash. 
County Water Conservancy Dist. v. Morgan, 2003 UT 58, P 6 n.2, 82 P.3d 1125; 
accord Harris v. Springville City. 712 P.2d 188,190 (Utah 1986) (*'[L]ack of standing 
is jurisdictional."); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983) ("[T]he 
moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court."). Under the 
traditional test for standing, "the interests of the parties must be adverse" and "the 
parties seeking relief must have a legally protectible interest in the controversy." 
Jenkins. 675 P.2d at 1148. 
2. Did the Appellee Swanson meet its burden of production in prosecuting 
its motion for summary judgment before the court below? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a trial court has properly granted 
summary judgment is a question of law which an appellate court will review for 
correctness, granting no deference to the trial court. Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 
922P. 2d 745 (Utah 1996). 
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant raised this issue and argued it 
before the court below in its written submissions ( R.318) and at oral argument. 
2 
3. Do the procedural requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-ll(2)(a) 
constitute a procedural bar, and if so, did the Appellee Swanson waive the 
benefits of that statute by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether a procedural requirement in a statute 
operates as a claim preclusion rule or as a jurisdictional limitation is question of 
statutory construction. Questions of statutory construction are questions of law which 
an appellate court reviews with no deference to the trial court's interpretation. 
Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 
1990). 
PRESERVATION BELOW: The Appellant raised this issue in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment (R. 228), and in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for new trial (R.319). 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES. 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that 
pertain to this appeal are identified in the Table of Authorities and are fully set forth 
in the body of this brief. 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant Victor Plastering timely filed it lien action to enforce its lien for 
stucco work it had performed on the subject property, but did not file a lis pendens 
3 
in relation to that lien action. It then filed an amended complaint and with that 
amended complaint commenced an in rem proceeding to declare its lien superior to 
the Appellee Swanson's dead lien. Rather than letting Victor proceed in rem against 
Swanson's expired lien, Swanson answered on the merits and personally appeared to 
contest the lien priority alleged by Victor in its amended complaint. 
However, in its answer Swanson did not allege that it had an interest in the 
subject property. It also did not allege in its answer that it never received actual 
knowledge of the commencement of Victor's lien action, nor did it invoke the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2). Swanson then brought a motion for 
summary judgment arguing that it did not have actual knowledge and that under 
§11(2) Victor's lien was void. Victor cross-applied for summary judgment asserting 
that because Swanson had no interest in the subject property it had no interest in the 
litigation and no standing to invoke the provisions of § 11(2). Indeed, in its 
summary judgment papers Swanson asserted "that it does not have a present lien 
interest in the Subject Property and that it does not have any interest in this 
litigation." 
VI. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
April 13, 2004 The Appellant Victor timely filed an action to enforce its 
mechanic's lien against property in Utah County. Victor had 
4 
stuccoed the house constructed on that property and had not been 
paid. 
February 10, 2006 The trial court granted Victor leave to amend its complaint and 
include in the amended complaint its in rem claims against 
Swanson's lien. 
July 3, 2006 Swanson answered Victor's amended complaint on the merits. 
R.46 
Dec. 15,2006 Swanson moved for summary judgment on its expired lien. R.179 
January 18, 2007 Victor opposed that motion and cross-applied for summary 
judgment. R.230 
January 24, 2007 Swanson opposed Victor's motion for summary judgment by 
admitting that it had no interest in the subject real property. R.236 
February 15, 2007 The trial court issued a memorandum order granting Swanson fs 
motion for summary judgment. That order is never entered on the 
trial court's docket. 
March 7, 2007 Victor filed a motion for a new trial on Victor's motion for 
summary judgment against Swanson. Because the Court had 
never entered on its docket its order dated February 15, 2007 
Victor's motion for a new trial operates as a motion for 
5 
reconsideration under rule 54(b). R.315 
March 21, 2007 Swanson filed its opposition to that motion. R.347 
April 3, 2007 Swanson filed its second memorandum in opposition to Victor's 
motion for reconsideration of its motion for summary judgment 
summary judgment. R.380 
April 13, 2007 Victor filed its reply memorandum in support of its motion for 
reconsideration. R.388 
April 16, 2007 Victor's motion is orally argued before the court. 
May 9, 2007 The court issues a memorandum ruling denying Victor's motion 
for reconsideration and directing counsel for Swanson for prepare 
a formal judgment to be signed by the trial court. R.402 
June 7, 2007 Judgment is entered in favor of Swanson. R.416 
June 8, 2007 Victor filed its notice of appeal. R.418 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the Appellant Victor Plastering timely filed it lien action but did not 
file a lis pendens in relation to that action, its lien was not void ab initio but under 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) could be rendered void if a party with an interest in the 
subject property established that they did not have actual knowledge of the lien action 
within 180 days of its commencement. The Appellee Swanson's lien on the subject 
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property had expired long before it was made a party to the action and Victor named 
Swanson as a party defendant for the purpose of proceeding in rem against Swanson's 
dead lien by declaring it inferior to Victor's lien. That in rem relief was the sole relief 
that Victor sought in relation to Swanson. 
In the proceeding below Swanson advised "that it does not have a present lien 
interest in the Subject Property and that it does not have any interest in this 
litigation," and in doing so acknowledged the in rem nature of Victor's claim to 
priority over Swanson's dead lien. By Swanson's own admission it could not incur 
any injury as a result of Victor's in rem lien proceeding and so lacked standing to 
contest the merits of Victor's claims to lien priority or to invoke the provisions of § 
11(2) as a defense to Victor's lien claim. Because Swanson lacked standing to contest 
the merits of Victor's lien claim the trial court erred in granting Swanson summary 
judgment on the basis of its § 11(2) claim. 
Swanson also failed to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment. It 
failed to show that it had any interest in the subject property, and in fact asserted that 
it had no interest in the property or the litigation. An interest in the subject property 
is an element of Swanson's prima facie case for summary judgment. Unless it 
establishes that element of its case, it had no grounds for summary judgment. 
Swanson also failed to plead § 11(2) as an affirmative defense. Unlike Utah 
7 
Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1) which is a statute of repose and so an absolute jurisdictional 
bar to a lien claim that is untimely, § 11(2) by its own terms is not an absolute bar but 
only operates to void a lien where the defendant establishes that it lacked actual 
knowledge of the commencement of a lien action. Because controlling case authority 
defines a statute of repose as one which is an absolute bar to an action, § 1 l(2)'s 
allowance of a lien action even though a lis pendens is not filed, unless the defendant 
proves it lacked actual knowledge of the commencement of the lien action, means that 
§ 11(2) operates as a procedural limitation and not as a statute of repose. As a statute 
of limitation § 1 l(2)'s provisions must be affirmatively pled in a defendant's answer 
(or asserted in a motion to dismiss filed prior to the defendant's pleading), or its 
provisions are waived. Swanson failed to plead § 11(2) and so waived its provisions. 
With that waiver Swanson had no basis for its summary judgment motion and Victor 
should have instead been granted summary judgment. 
Swanson chose to contest the merits of Victor's claim to lien priority, without 
any basis in fact or law justifying that contest, which brings Swanson's defense 
within the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 and Victor is entitled to its 
attorney fees before this Court and the court below. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
A. The Appellee Swanson must have an interest in the subject 
property to have standing to contest the validity of the Appellant 
8 
Victor's lien. 
Swanson's lack of standing to seek relief under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) 
is exposed when the nature of the proceeding below is properly considered. Victor's 
complaint pleads an in rem request for a declaratory judgment finding that 
Swanson's interest in the subject property is inferior to Victor's. This in rem 
declaratory relief was Victor's sole purpose in naming Swanson as a party defendant. 
Because Swanson had no interest in the subject property and could not be adversely 
affected by Victor's claim to priority of its lien over Swanson's void lien, in 
responding to Victor's complaint Swanson had no standing to invoke the 
requirements of § 11(2). In fact, in the course of briefing its summary judgment 
motion before the court below, Swanson admitted it had no interest in the subject 
property and no interest in the litigation.1 "One who is not adversely affected has no 
standing."2 
Swanson's inability to prove any adverse effect from Victor's lien action is key 
to showing that under Utah law Swanson lacked standing to seek relief under § 11(2). 
Unlike the federal judiciary which is constrained by the Article III case or controversy 
clause, in determining whether a litigant has standing Utah courts focus on the 
XR.236. 
2Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). 
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separation of powers doctrine. Standing is a concept "rooted in the historical and 
constitutional role of the judiciary" as one of three separate and equal branches of 
government.3 Moreover, "the question of whether a given individual or association 
has standing to request a particular relief is primarily a question of law, although 
there may be factual findings that bear on the issue."4 Note that in this case there are 
no factual findings in issue because Swanson admitted it had no interest in the subject 
property. Under the traditional test for standing, a litigant must demonstrate a 
"particularized" injury, which in a lien action can only occur if the named defendant 
has an interest in the property.5 
In Utah foreclosure proceedings are in rem6 and the question then arises of how 
it is that Swanson, which had no interest in the subject property, can demonstrate a 
particularized injury. Because this was an in rem proceeding, merely being named as 
a party did not threaten personal liability against Swanson. There was no requirement 
that Swanson appear and defend on the merits against Victor's claim. Only if 
Swanson, as an uninterested party, chose to appear and frivolously defend on the 
3Id. at 1149. 
4Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Wilkinson. 946 P.2d 372, 373 (Utah 1997). 
5SocV of Prof 1 Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Utah 1987). 
"See P.I.E. Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Bass. 759 P.2d 1144, FN4 (Utah 
1988) where the court ruled: "A proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is 
considered an action in rem or quasi in rem under Utah law. (citations omitted)." 
10 
merits against Victor's claim would Swanson be exposed to a claim for attorney fees. 
And even when Swanson chose to appear, it could have no proper interest in 
defending against Victor's lien claims, but only in advising the court that it had no 
interest in the subject property and that it was not contesting Victor's claims. 
Because the attorney fee provision of the mechanic's lien act only applies to 
the successful party in a contested proceeding,7 where there is no contest a defendant 
who is named only for in rem relief against some property interest appearing on the 
face of the title, will not be subject to an adverse attorney fee award if it does not 
contest an in rem declaration that its lien is void. Restated, there can be no losing 
party against whom the provisions of §38-1-18(1) can operate if the holder of a dead 
lien does not contest the plaintiffs claim to priority. Utah's mechanic's lien 
jurisprudence "ensures that only parties that are genuinely 'successful' according to 
the trial court's common sense logic will be able to extract their attorney fees from 
their opponents."8 
Originally, this was the procedural posture of Swanson before the court below. 
But then Swanson chose to convert an in rem declaratory proceeding to one that was 
also in personam by choosing to frivolously contest on the merits Victor's lien 
7A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy. 2004 UT 47,1118. 
8Id. at 1125. 
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action. In doing so, Swanson chose to put itself at risk for attorney fees under § 38-1-
18, but this frivolous defense by Swanson did not somehow magically provide it with 
the standing necessary to invoke relief under § 11(2). 
Because Swanson admitted in its summary judgment papers that it had no 
interest in the property and no interest in the litigation, what then was Swanson 
defending? Certainly, it could not be defending its nonexistent lien, which Swanson 
admitted was void. How does one assert a defense on the merits in good faith 
knowing that there is nothing to defend? 
To have standing under the traditional test Swanson must have shown that it 
incurred a "distinct and palpable injury" by alleging that it suffered or will nsuffer[] 
some distinct and palpable injury that gives [it] a personal stake in the outcome of the 
legal dispute."9 The legal dispute between Victor and Swanson in this case concerns 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2). Not only did Swanson not plead the 
provisions of § 11(2) in its answer, thus failing to allege that it would suffer some 
distinct and palpable injury if the requirements of § 11(2) were not enforced against 
Victor, but Swanson in its summary judgment briefing admitted that it had no interest 
in the subject property, which conclusively foreclosed any claim of a distinct and 
palpable injury suffered by Swanson. 
9Jenkins, 675 P.2d at 1148 (Utah 1983). 
12 
If further proof of the futility of Swanson's claim to standing under the 
traditional test is needed, examination of whether Swanson has suffered a distinct and 
palpable injury under the three-step inquiry used in Jenkins is conclusive.10 First, 
Swanson must allege that it has been or will be "adversely affected" by Victor's 
failure to file a lis pendens.11 Leaving aside for the moment that in its answer 
Swanson never alleged harm under § 11(2), Swanson's admission that it has no 
interest in the subject property in any event disposes of any issue of whether it alleged 
it was harmed by Victor's failure to file a lis pendens. 
Second, Swanson must allege a causal relationship between Victor's failure 
to file a lis pendens, Victor's in rem declaratory lien action and the harm Swanson 
would incur by a declaration that its dead lien is dead.12 But unless Swanson has an 
interest in the subject property there can be no causal connection between Victor's 
failure to file a lis pendens, Victor's lien foreclosure action and the harm Swanson 
would incur by a declaration that any interest Swanson has in the subject property is 
inferior to Victor's. Swanson is simply a stranger to the property, and as a stranger 
is requesting relief to which it is not entitled. 
Third, the relief requested must be "substantially likely" to redress Victor's 
1 0
^ e i d a t l l 5 0 . 
12Id. 
13 
failure to file a lis pendens. Again, not only did Swanson not claim in its pleadings 
any injury accruing pursuant to § 11(2), the voiding of Victor's lien because Swanson 
allegedly did not have actual notice could do nothing to revive Swanson's dead lien. 
Because Swanson could obtain nothing by the prosecution of a defense under § 11(2), 
it is impossible to provide it with redress by voiding Victor's lien. 
"If the party can satisfy these three criteria, the party has standing to pursue 
its claims before the courts of this state."14 Not only has Swanson failed to satisfy all 
three of these criteria, thus failing to establish standing under the traditional test, 
Swanson cannot satisfy even one of these three criteria, which further establishes that 
its claims under § 11(2) are and were frivolous.15 The speciousness of Swanson's 
summary judgment motion is also confirmed by Swanson's failure to plead any 
factual allegations in its answer stating a colorable claim to standing under § 11(2), 
its failure to proffer any facts in support of its summary judgment motion establishing 
standing under § 11(2), and its admission in its summary judgment papers that it had 
1 3 Idat l l49. 
14Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club et al. v. Utah Air Quality Board et al., 
2006 UT 74,1119. 
15The remaining ground for standing available to Swanson is that this case 
presents a question of importance to the public and that there is no one else better 
situated that Swanson to vindicate that interest. Just stating the proposition 
exposes its fallacy. This dispute is purely private and there is nothing of 
importance to the general public to be vindicated by allowing Swanson to contest 
the validity of Victor's lien. 
14 
no interest in the subject property, which conclusively establishes its lack of standing 
under § 11(2). Clearly, it was Victor and not Swanson that was entitled to summary 
judgment and Victor requests that the Court so rule. 
B. Swanson Failed To Meets Its Burden of Production on 
Summary Judgment, 
The burden of production on summary judgment is different than the burden 
of proof at trial. At trial a plaintiff presents its case in chief and if at the close of that 
case it fails to present a prima facie case, the defendant is entitled to a directed 
verdict. But where a defendant is moving for summary judgment a case presents a 
fundamentally different procedural posture because it is the defendant, as the moving 
party, which must produce proof sufficient to negate the plaintiffs claims against the 
defendant. Regardless of whether a summary judgment motion is opposed, unless the 
party moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 presents a prima facie case 
supporting its claim to summary judgment, summary judgment is improper.16 
16See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 922P. 2d 745 (Utah 1996). We find 
that the manner in which these affidavits were presented provided an insufficient 
factual basis for the district court's ruling. Ordinarily, the opponent to a summary 
judgment motion must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). However, that burden is triggered only when 
"a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule." 
Id. (emphasis added). "Unless the moving party meets its initial burden to present 
evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, 'the party 
opposing the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 (Utah 1996) (quoting K&T, 
Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994)). The Madsen affidavit failed to 
15 
In this case, a key elements of its summary judgment claim was never proven 
by Swanson because it failed to prove that it had an interest in the subject property. 
The fact that Swanson had no interest in the subject property was, so far as Swanson 
could be concerned, the whole point of Victor's amended complaint seeking in rem 
declaratory relief against Swanson's dead lien. If Swanson had no interest in the 
subject property, it had no case for opposing Victor's claim that its lien was entitled 
to priority over Swanson's dead lien. 
Indeed, not only did Swanson not have an interest in the subject property, it 
admitted that it had no interest in the subject property.17 Because Swanson admitted 
that it had no interest in the subject property and in fact no interest in the litigation 
before the court below, the only party with a litigation interest regarding Swanson's 
lien was Victor. As explained above, it had an interest in rem to declare Swanson's 
negate any disputed issue regarding the impact of the change in diversion points 
on the private wells. Whatever expertise Madsen had acquired as an irrigator, it 
was not plainly pertinent to the question of impact on water tables; nor did he 
provide any foundational facts supporting his opinion. See, e.g., King v. Searle 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858, 864 n.2 (Utah 1992) ("Affidavits of experts 
are insufficient. . . unless foundational facts are set forth supporting their opinions 
and conclusions."). Rather, he simply asserted in conclusory fashion that 
movement of water upstream could not impact the water table near plaintiffs' 
wells. 
llSee R.236, where Swanson states: "Swanson admits that it does not have a 
present lien interest in the Subject Property and that it does not have any interest in 
this litigation." 
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lien inferior to Victor's. 
The trial court in its May 9, 2007 ruling found that Victor had plead Swanson 
into court by alleging that Swanson "hold[s] some claim of right, title, or interest to 
the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that all [Swanson's] claims of 
right, title or interest... [is] subject to the prior claims and interests of PLAINTIFF 
. . ." First, the trial court's interpretation of this text in Victor's amended complaint 
incorrectly reads the word "claim" out of that pleading. Alleging that a defendant 
holds some right, title or interest in property is far different from alleging that a 
defendant claims that they hold some right, title or interest in property. The former 
is an admission that a defendant has some interest in property, whatever it might be, 
but the latter is nothing more than an allegation that a defendant claims an interest, 
but does not admit that a defendant actually has an interest. By implicitly omitting the 
word "claim" from its construction of Victor's pleading, the trial court improperly 
restated that pleading to make an allegation it did not make. A finding that Victor 
conclusively admitted that Swanson had an interest in the subject property should be 
based on something more than such a dubious and speculative inference. 
The intent of the pleading is clear. Victor is alleging that it has a valid lien and 
alleging that whatever Swanson has, be it something or nothing, Victor's lien is a 
superior interest. The allegation that Victor's lien is a superior interest holds true 
17 
regardless of whether Swanson has some interest in the property or no interest 
whatsoever. Even if it is not technically true that Swanson claimed some interest in 
the subject property, it is evident that Victor is making this allegation as a device for 
putting into issue expired liens recorded against the title to the property so that 
Victor's lien can be declared to be a superior interest. In any event, the critical 
distinction is that by using the word "claim" Victor made clear in its pleading that it 
was not alleging that the named defendants actually held an interest in the subject 
property. 
Further, the Baldwin v. Vantage Corp.18 decision is one where the Utah 
Supreme Court refused to find a pleading admission conclusive because it was 
contradicted by another pleading allegation which stated just the opposite, because 
in subsequent discovery the admission was denied and because in subsequent 
litigation the parties conducted themselves as if there was no admission. Here, 
Swanson has negated any inference (however slight) that might be taken from 
Victor's pleading that Swanson claimed an interest in the property, by asserting in its 
motion for summary judgment that it had no interest in the property. By explicitly 
refuting any purported admission by Victor, Swanson brought this issue within the 
exception stated in Baldwin for pleading admissions on issues that are nevertheless 
18676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984). 
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litigated by the parties as if there was no admission. 
Most important, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1) is an absolute statutory bar to 
the trial court's finding that Victor somehow had in its pleading admitted that 
Swanson had an interest in the property and that this admission was conclusive. A 
party cannot by its pleading vest a court with subject matter jurisdiction.19 Victor's 
analysis in part A of its argument demonstrates that because Swanson's lien was 
absolutely void at the time it contested the merits of Victor's claim to priority, 
Swanson had no standing to invoke the provisions of § 11(2). Unless Swanson had 
standing to invoke that section, the trial court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction,20 or more properly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate that 
issue.21 
19Sosna v. Iowa. 419 U.S. 393, 398, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975). 
2QUtah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd.. 2006 UT 74,1113 
(standing triggers the court's . . . subject matter jurisdiction). 
21
 Although Victor for the sake of convenience refers to this lack of 
jurisdiction as a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the better characterization may 
be that the court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the § 11(2) defense asserted by 
Swanson. The case of Palmer v. U.S.. 168 F.3d 1310, 1313 (C.A. Fed 1999) is 
instructive on this issue: 
The trial court politely but firmly explained to the Government the 
difference between a court's general power to adjudicate in specific 
areas of substantive law, on the one hand, and the question of whether 
in a specific case a court is able to exercise its general power with 
regard to the facts peculiar to the specific claim, on the other. The 
former is a question of a court's subject matter jurisdiction, and is 
19 
Proof that Swanson had an interest in the subject property was critical to 
Swanson mounting any semblance of a good faith challenge to Victor's in rem 
declaratory proceeding against the dead Swanson lien. Unless Swanson had standing, 
it could not make out a case for summary judgment. In particular, without the 
predicate showing of an interest in the property Swanson could not even get to the 
issue of whether Victor could show that Swanson had actual knowledge of Victor's 
lien action. Swanson admits that it did not have an interest in the subject property and 
without that interest, it had no case for summary judgment. 
C. The procedural requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-ll(2)(a) 
operate as a statute of limitation and the Appellee Swanson waived the 
benefits of that rule by failing to plead it as an affirmative defense. 
i. A statute of repose is one which absolutely bars an action and the 
Supreme Court of Utah has ruled that Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(2)(a) 
does not absolutely bar an action. 
In Projects Unlimited v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co.22 the Supreme Court 
of Utah analyzed the two different functions served by subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Utah 
properly raised by a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) motion; the latter is 
properly addressed as a question of whether the plaintiff has stated a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, and is raised by a 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion (the Court of Federal Claims 
denominates this an RCFC 12(b)(4) motion). 
By analogy, Swanson's invocation of § 11(2) in its summary judgment motion 
assert a defense over which the trial court could not exercise jurisdiction. 
22798 P.2d 738, (Utah 1990). 
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Code Ann. § 38-1-11. The first, which is § 11(1), recites the time within which a 
mechanic's lien action must be commenced.23 In referring to § 11(1) the court held 
that the time for commencement of an action to enforce a mechanic's lien is a 
substantive restriction on the lien action, not merely a procedural bar to the action, 
and as such is a jurisdictional bar to a lien action which is not commenced within the 
time limited. 
By finding that a failure to comply with subparagraph § 11(1) was a 
jurisdictional bar to further action on a lien claim, the Projects court applied the 
longstanding principle that a "statute of repose bars all actions after a specified period 
of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an 
injury that gives rise to a cause of action."24 It is undisputed that Victor timely 
commenced its mechanic's lien action and that § 11(1) is not at issue in this case. 
The second part of that statute, which is § 11(2), requires that a lis pendens be 
filed: 
Within the time period provided for filing in Subsection (1) the lien 
claimant shall file for record with the county recorder of each county in 
which the lien is recorded a notice of the pendency of the action, in the 
manner provided in actions affecting the title or right to possession of 
real property, or the lien shall be void, except as to persons who have 
23Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1) (2004). A lien claimant shall file an action 
to enforce the lien filed under this chapter within 180 days from the day on which 
the lien claimant filed a notice of claim under Section 38-1-7. 
24Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, (Utah 1985). 
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been made parties to the action and persons having actual knowledge of 
the commencement of the action.25 
But in analyzing subparagraphs (1) and (2) the Projects court noted that they served 
"two different purposes" and that although a failure to comply with subparagraph (1) 
absolutely renders the lien void, the same absolute bar to proceeding on the lien does 
not operate in relation to subparagraph (2): 
"However, the limited effect of a failure to comply with this requirement 
is expressly set forth in [subparagraph (2)]. When a claimant fails to file 
the lis pendens within the twelve-month period, the lien itself is not 
invalidated, but rather it is rendered void as to everyone except those 
named in the action and those with actual knowledge of the action." 
Because a failure to comply with subparagraph (2) does not of itself categorically 
invalidate a lien, that subparagraph is not an absolute bar to the enforcement of a lien 
and so does not operate as a statute of repose but instead is a statute of limitation. The 
rule in Berry was reaffirmed and restated in Lee v. Gaufin26 where the court ruled: 
Unlike statutes of limitations, statutes of repose abolish a cause of action 
after a certain period, even if the action first accrues after the period has 
expired. 
Applied to this case, although § 11(2) imposes a limitation on a lien claimant's ability 
to bring a lien action, failure to comply with that limitation does not per se abolish the 
lien claimant's cause of action, and so that limitation does not fall within the 
25Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) (2004). 
867 P.2d 572, (Utah 1993). 
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definition of a statute of repose. 
Instead, § 11(2) sets up, by the force of its terms, an exception to the 
jurisdictional time limit stated in subparagraph § 11(1). Although failure to comply 
with the 180 day time is a per se violation of § 11(1) which absolutely voids a lien, 
under § 11(2), a lien is void only if the person against whom the lien is asserted is 
not a party to the action or the person against whom the lien is asserted did not have 
actual notice of the commencement of the action. By conditioning the operation of 
§ 11(2) on a showing of a lack of actual notice this subparagraph, rather than 
imposing an absolute bar to the jurisdiction of a trial court, instead sets up a rule 
which makes that bar contingent on the opposing party showing that it did not receive 
actual notice. Although the requirements of § 11(2) are mandatory and if properly 
raised will require that a lien action be dismissed, they are not framed within the 
terms of a statute of repose and so are not jurisdictional.27 
27See Kiesel v. District Court, 96 Utah 156, 84 P.2d 782 (1938), where the 
court construed a statute requiring a plaintiff to file an undertaking, or bond, 
securing costs contemporaneously with the complaint. The court held that the 
statute's requirements, while mandatory, still did not create a jurisdictional 
prerequisite: 
The language of [the statute], while positive and mandatory, when 
considered altogether makes the requirement only that the 
undertaking be filed contemporaneously with the complaint. This 
certainly is no stronger than the language of [other] statutes which 
require the bond to be filed before commencing action. But we think 
the legislature intended to make the requirement so positive and 
23 
ii. A statute can be mandatory without being jurisdictional. Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-1-11(2) is such a statute. 
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Pearson v. Lamb28 where it 
construed a parallel provision of the Mechanic's Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
ll(4)(a), which requires that contemporaneous with the service of a complaint, as 
required by § 11(1), a "lien claimant shall include with the service of the complaint 
on the owner of a residence" instructions regarding the owner's rights under the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Recovery Fund Act. In Pearson this Court ruled that 
failure to serve the required instructions was not necessarily fatal to a lien claim and 
that this requirement in the Act, although mandatory, was not jurisdictional. 
In analyzing the mandatory nature of § ll(4)(a) the Pearson decision states in 
dicta that failure to timely file a lis pendens is fatal to proceeding with an action on 
unequivocal as to require the court to dismiss the suit if the bond was 
not filed at least contemporaneously with the complaint if [a] motion 
to dismiss was timely made. Otherwise, the court could continue to 
take jurisdiction. 
28 2005 UTApp 383. 
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a lien. However, this dicta30 was the result of a reference to the Interlake Distribs., 
Inc. v. Old Mill Towne31 decision, which is one where the parties asserting § 11(2) 
as a defense appear to have properly pleaded § 11(2) as an affirmative defense and 
to have had a valid actual interest in the land in issue, which provided them with 
standing invoke § 11(2) as a defense. The failure to plead facts establishing standing 
under § 11(2) or to assert the provisions of § 11(2) as an affirmative defense were 
never at issue in Interlake, and so this Court's dicta in Pearson assumes the existence 
of the very thing that does not exist in this case (i.e., Swanson never pled facts 
showing it had standing to invoke § 11(2), § 11(2) was never pled as an affirmative 
defense by Swanson, and Swanson admits it had no interest in the subject property). 
The rationale of Pearson v. Lamb, which is that although the subparagraphs in 
§ 38-1-11 other than § 11(1) are mandatory, it does not necessarily follow that they 
are jurisdictional; should, in light of the plain holding of the Projects decision, be 
29Pearson at 1114: Utah courts have thus ruled that failure to timely 
commence a mechanics' lien foreclosure action and file a lis pendens, like failure 
to timely notify the state of a claim against it, divests the court of jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., Interlake Distribs., Inc. v. Old Mill Towne, 954 P.2d 1295,1297-99 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that liens were void because plaintiffs failed to file a lis 
pendens). 
30Pearson at | 4 : uThe only issue before this court is whether Plaintiffs 
failure to comply with section 38-l-ll(4)(a) of the Mechanics1 Liens Act divested 
the trial court of jurisdiction . . ." 
31954 P.2d 1295, 1297-99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
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applied with equal force to find that § 11(2) is not jurisdictional. Finding that § 11(2) 
is not jurisdictional means that the failure to file a lis pendens is not necessarily fatal 
to a lien claim (a construction which accords with the express terms of the statute), 
so it falls upon the defendant asserting a lack of actual knowledge to plead in its 
answer that it did not have actual knowledge and that the lien is therefore void. 
iii. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) must be pled as an affirmative defense 
or it is waived. 
"[A] rule 8(c) affirmative defense is a defense employed to defeat the plaintiffs 
claim by raising matters outside or extrinsic to the plaintiff's prima facie case."32 That 
is exactly the manner in which § 11(2) operates in relation to a mechanic's lien claim. 
By raising matters extrinsic to the lien claimant's prima facie case it falls within the 
definition of a Rule 8(c) affirmative defense. 
Further, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that any defense shall be 
asserted in a responsive pleading or by motion, but that any such motion must be 
made before pleading.33 And rule 12(h) provides that a party "waives all defenses . 
. . . not presented by motion or by answer or reply . . . ."34 These are the very 
procedures that Swanson was required to follow if it wished to assert the 
32Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 68, 31, citing Jones. Waldo. 
Holbrook & McDonough. 923 P.2d at 1374. 
33Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). 
34Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h). 
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requirements of § 11(2). It is undisputed that in this case Swanson did not plead the 
requirements of § 11(2), nor did it assert them by a timely motion to dismiss prior to 
pleading. 
It has long been the rule in our courts that a party cannot assert in support of 
a motion for summary judgment an affirmative defense it has never pled in its 
answer.35 Nor can it amend its answer by raising an affirmative defense for the first 
time in its summary judgment motion.36 If an affirmative defense is not pled in an 
answer it is waived.37 Under this authority, because Swanson did not raise § 11(2) as 
an affirmative defense it waived its benefits and it was error for the trial court to take 
cognizance of that defense in ruling in favor of Swanson's motion for summary 
judgment and in ruling against Victor's motion for summary judgment. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Victor commenced a lien action in which it asserted that its lien had priority 
over the Swanson lien and that because of that priority sought a declaration that 
Swanson's interest in the subject property was inferior to Victor's. This in rem 
35Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken. 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). 
36See Holmes Development. L.L.C. v. Cooke. 2002 UT 38,1115; see also 
Harper v. Evans. 2008 UT App 66. 
31
 See Summit Water Distrib. Co. v. Summit County. 2005 UT 73,1147; see 
also Creekview Apts. v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 771 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
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declaration was the sole relief that Victor sought against Swanson, whose lien had 
already expired and was void as of the commencement of Victor's declaratory in rem 
proceeding. Because Swanson's lien had long been dead it could not be injured, 
harmed or adversely affected by Victor's claim of lien priority. Swanson had no 
standing to contest the merits of Victor' s in rem proceeding to declare its lien superior 
to Swanson's in the subject property. Moreover, Swanson knew or should have 
known that because it had no interest in the subject property it had no standing to 
contest the merits of Victor's claim to lien priority. 
But Swanson chose to appear and frivolously contest the merits of Victor's 
claim to lien priority, asserting that Victor had failed to state a claim against 
Swanson's lien upon which relief could be granted and specifically denying Victor's 
claim of lien priority by asserting Swanson lacked information to admit that claim and 
so denied it. Yet Swanson knew it had no interest in the subject property, so how 
could it deny on the basis of lack of information? 
Swanson then failed to raise Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-11(2) as an affirmative 
defense and moved for summary judgment on the basis of an affidavit which did no 
more than conclude that Swanson did not have actual knowledge of the 
commencement of Victor's lien action, without proffering any facts in support of that 
conclusion. 
Accordingly, Victor respectfully requests that the trial court's order granting 
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Swanson summary judgment be reversed and that Victor instead be granted summary 
judgment. 
Appellant Victor Plastering, Inc. also requests that it be awarded its attorney 
fees before this Court and the court below. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 specifically 
provides that such fees shall be awarded to the successful party and case authority is 
to the same effect. 
DATED this 15th day of April, 2008. 
RONALD ADY, Attoflhey for the 
Appellant Victor Plas/ering, Inc. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the 16th day of April, 2008 I deposited a true copy of the 
foregoing Appellants' Brief in the United States mail, first-class postage 
pre-paid to: 
Arnold Richer, Esq. 
Richer Overholt, P.C. 
901 West Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, UT 84095 
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C. The trial court's February 15, 2007 and May 9, 2007 memorandum ruling. 
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Tab A 
RONALD ADY (3694) 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 539-1900 
Fax: (801)322-1054 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PLASTERING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
CHRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA COLLINS, 
COBALT HOMES, INC. dba COBALT 
HOMES STYLE BUILDER & COBALT 
HOMES THE CEDARS L.L.C. dba 
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS, 
BRIAN K. BRADY, MASCO 
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING 
MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY 
ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL 
SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1 
through 10. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 040401255 
Judge Hansen 
For complaint against Defendants, Plaintiff alleges as follows: 
1. PLAINTIFF is a Utah corporation its principal place of business in Utah County, State 
of Utah. 
2. PLAINTIFF is a stucco contractor duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah. 
3. Defendants Chris A. Collins and Channa Collins ("Homeowners"), own an interest in real 
property located in Utah, State of Utah, having a legal description as follows: LOT 15, PLAT J2, 
CEDARS AT CEDAR HILLS SUBDIVISION, CEDAR HILLS (the "Property"). The Homeowners 
are named as defendants in this action solely for the purposes of proceeding against the real property 
described above, and not to obtain any judgment or relief in personam against Homeowners. 
4. Defendant COBALT HOMES INC. and/or the Defendant COBALT HOMES INC. dba 
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS is a Utah corporation doing business in Utah County, State 
of Utah and at all times relevant to PLAINTIFF'S claims in this complaint, was licensed as a general 
contractor in the State of Utah. 
5. That the above-referenced property is a single family dwelling and may have been an 
owner-occupied residence that is not offered for sale to the public within the meaning of the 
Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act, Title 38, Chapter 11 of the Utah Code 
(hereinafter the FUND). 
6. That the Defendant Homeowners formerly occupied that residence or may have occupied 
the residence, or that the residence was or, after completion of the construction on the residence, may 
have been occupied by the owner or the owner's tenant and lessee as a primary or secondary 
residence within 180 days from the date of the completion of the construction on the residence. 
7. That the Defendant Homeowner may have entered into a contract with Defendant 
COBALT HOMES INC. (hereinafter referred to as the Defendant Contractor) for the construction of 
an owner-occupied residence upon the above-described real property. 
8. That on or about September 19, 2005 the Defendant Homeowners filed a petition in 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of California as case number 05-08818. On Schedule A of their Voluntary Petition 
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in that bankruptcy they show the above-described real property with a current market value of 
$208,000 and secured claims totaling $256,824.00. On Schedule C of that Petition they claim 
$18,675.00 of that real property as exempt. In paragraph 15 of the Statement of Financial Affairs 
attached to that petition, the Defendant Homeowners show that they last occupied the above-described 
real property on January 5,2005. On Defendant Homeowners Statement of Intentions filed with that 
petition, they identify the above described real property as "Property to be Surrendered"and list 
Citibank and Citimortgage as the creditor's name relating to that property. 
9. That the Defendant Contractor may have been a licensed contractor at all times when it was 
building the aforementioned owner-occupied residence. 
10. PLAINTIFF and Defendant Contractor entered into a contract under which PLAINTIFF 
was to construct certain improvements to the Property on behalf of Defendant Homeowners. 
11. PLAINTIFF first provided materials and labor for the Property on or about September 26, 
2003. 
12. On or about October 16, 2003, PLAINTIFF completed the contracted improvements to 
the Property. 
13. PLAINTIFF has demanded payment from Cobalt and Collins, who have refused to make 
payment. 
14.On January 14,2004, PLAINTIFF recorded a mechanic's lien against the Property pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-7 (1953, as amended) in the amount of $16,250.00, notice of which 
was mailed via certified mail to Defendants. 
15. That Defendants, CHRIS A. COLLINS and CHANNA M. COLLINS, MASCO 
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT MORTGAGE CORPORATION, CONSTRUCTION 
PRODUCTS COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY 
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ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1 through 10 all hold 
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that all 
of the claims of right, title or interest of each of these Defendants and all persons claiming by, 
through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of 
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may assert 
an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established. 
CLAIM ONE: FORECLOSURE ON MECHANIC'S LIEN 
16. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
17. As a result of the Defendant Contractor's breach of contract, PLAINTIFF has been 
compelled to prepare and file Notice of Liens, a copy of which said Liens are herewith attached and 
incorporated as Exhibit ""A"". 
18. That if the Defendant Homeowners can establish that he or she has complied with the 
FUND, he or she may become exempt from the Lien and Bond Statutes of the State of Utah. As 
required by §38-1-11 of the Utah Code, a form ""Homeowner's Application For Certificate of 
Compliance"" and Instructions are attached hereto as Exhibit M"B"" for the Defendant Homeowner's 
use. 
19. That pursuant to §38-1-11(4) (d) of the Utah Code, this Court must stay proceedings as 
to the Defendant Homeowners until such time as the Defendant Homeowners have had a reasonable 
period of time to establish compliance with §38-11-204(4) (a) and (4) (b) of the Utah Code through 
an informal proceeding, as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, 
commenced within 30 days of the owner being served summons in the foreclosure action, at the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing and obtain a certificate of compliance or denial 
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of certificate of compliance, as defined in §38-11-102 of the Utah Code. 
20. That the Defendant Homeowners have had 30 days from the date of service of the 
Complaint upon them in this action to complete and file the Homeowners Application for Certificate 
of Compliance with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing for the State of Utah, 
as required by §38-1-11 of the Utah Code, in default of which the Defendant Homeowners lose the 
protection they otherwise may have under the FUND. 
21. That if the Defendant Homeowners cannot establish that they have complied with the 
FUND, PLAINTIFF is entitled to a Decree of Foreclosure of PLAINTIFF'S Mechanic's Lien and to 
an Order of Sale that the Sheriff conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first, to the cost 
of sale; second, to the satisfaction of PLAINTIFF'S Lien, interest, Court costs, accrued interest 
pursuant to statute and attorney's fees; and third, that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants 
and owners. 
CLAIM TWO: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
22. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
23. Cobalt has breached its contract with PLAINTIFF and PLAINTIFF is entitled to damages 
in the contract amount of$16,250.00 or as may be proven at trial plus accrued interest pursuant to 
statute. 
CLAIM THREE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
24. PLAINTIFF incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
25. PLAINTIFF has provided materials and services to Defendant(s) equal to or in excess of 
the amount of $16,250.00. 
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26. The materials and services provided by PLAINTIFF have increased the value of the 
properties where the materials were placed and/or the value of the Defendant Contractor's business. 
27. Upon information and belief, PLAINTIFF alleges that Defendant, BRIAN K. BRADY, 
who is the controlling and operating shareholder behind the Defendant corporation, COBALT 
HOMES INC., has been unjustly enriched in the amount of $16,250.00 or the Defendant, COBALT 
HOMES INC., has been unjustly enriched in the same amount. 
28. PLAINTIFF is entitled to compensation from Defendants, COBALT HOMES INC., 
and/or BRIAN K. BRADY for the value of the services and material provided and for the amount by 
which Defendant has been unjustly enriched, which amount is $16,250.00, plus interest through 
October 16, 2003 and continuing interest thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until 
paid as provided by Section 58-55-603 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), plus any costs of court 
and attorney's fees as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
29. Defendants have refused to make payment to PLAINTIFF for the material and services 
provided and to allow Defendants to retain the benefit of the materials and service provided by 
PLAINTIFFs will unjustly enrich Defendants. 
30. Therefore PLAINTIFF should be allowed to recover from Defendants COBALT HOMES 
INC., and/or BRIAN K. BRADY the value of the materials and services rendered in the amount of 
$16,250.00, plus interest through Febnruary 3, 2006 and continuing interest thereon from said date 
at the rate of 12% per annum until paid as provided by Section 58- 55-603 of the Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), plus any costs of court and attorney's fees in order to prevent unjust enrichment. 
WHEREFORE, PLAINTIFF prays for relief against Defendants as follows: 
1. Foi'judgment against the Defendants, BRIAN K. BRADY, and COBALT HOMES INC.. 
for breach of contract in the amount of $16,250.00, plus interest through October 16, 2003 and 
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continuing interest thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, plus attorney's fees 
in the amount of at least $775.00, as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by 
contract and by UCA 38-1-18 et sec, plus all costs of Court. 
2. For a declaration that but for the Defendant Homeowners chapter 7 bankruptcy, Plaintiff 
would be entitled to a judgment against the Defendant Homeowners, Chris A. Collins and Channa M. 
Collins, in the amount of $16,250.00, plus interest through October 16,2003 and continuing interest 
thereon from said date at the rate of 12% per annum until paid, plus Court costs, reasonable attorney's 
fees of at least $775.00, as allowed by Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by contract and 
by UCA 38-1-18 et sec, plus all costs of Court. 
3. That the Court adjudge that PLAINTIFF'S Lien, attached hereto, is valid and that 
PLAINTIFF is entitled to the amount stated in said Lien, plus Court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, 
and interest at the rate and in the amount allowed by contract and by law. 
4. For an Order that PLAINTIFF'S Mechanic's Lien is prior to and superior to the interests of 
all Defendants herein. 
5. For a Decree of Foreclosure of PLAINTIFF'S Mechanics Lien and for an Order that the 
Sheriff of Utah County conduct a sale and apply the proceeds from said sale first to the cost of sale; 
second, to the satisfaction of PLAINTIFF'S Lien, interest, Court costs and attorney's fees; and third, 
that any surplus be given to the rightful claimants and owners. 
6. In the event that said sale is not sufficient to satisfy the entire amount of the lien, including 
all applicable interest, Court costs, and attorney's fees, as proscribed by law, PLAINTIFF prays for 
a Deficiency Judgment against the record owners of the property in the amount remaining due as to 
said property, as provided for by §38-1-16 of the Utah Code Annotated(1953). 
7. For an order of foreclosure of the mechanic's lien recorded by PLAINTIFF against the 
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Property for the amount of$16,250.00 plus attorney's fees, court costs, and accrued interest pursuant 
to statute; 
8. For judgment against Defendants COBALT HOMES INC. for damages in the amount of 
$16,250.00 and for a declaration that but for the Defendant Collins chapter 7 bankruptcy Plaintiff 
would be entitled to a judgment against Defendants Collins and COBALT HOMES INC., jointly and 
severally, for damages in the amount of $16,250.00; 
9. For prejudgment interest pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1; 
10. For such other relief as the Court deems reasonable in the premises. 
Dated this 12th of April, 2004. 
RONALD A0Y 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL 
8 
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RICHER & OVERHOLT P.C. 
901 West Baxter Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Telephone'(801) 561-4750 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Swanson Building Materials, Inc. 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
VICTOR PLASTERING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA 
COLLINS, COBALT HOMES, INC. 
d/b/a COBALT HOMES STYLE 
BUILDER & COBALT HOMES THE 
CEDARS, LLC d/b/a COBALT 
HOMES STYLE BUILDERS, BRIAN 
K BRADY, MASCO 
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, 
DIRECT MORTGAGE 
CORPORATION, CONSTRUCTION 
PRODUCTS COMPANY, 
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INC., DAVE'S QUALITY ROOFING, 
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BUILDING MATERIALS, INC.'s 
ANSWER TO PLAINTIFF'S 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 04Q401255 
Judge: Hansen 
Defendants. 
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Defendant, Swanson Building Materials, Inc. (hereinafter "Defendant") by and 
through its counsel of record, the law firm of RICHER & OVERHOLT, P.C., hereby 
responds to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim agjainst Defendant upon which 
relief may be granted and it should, therefore, be dismissed vt/ith Drejudice, with costs and 
fees being awarded to Defendant. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
(Answering Specific Numbered Allegations) 
1. Defendant is without sufficient information on belief as to the allegations 
contained in Paragraph 1 and therefore denies the same (hereinafter "Defendant denies 
for lack of information"). 
2. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
3. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
4. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
5. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
6. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
7. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
8. Defendantdeniesforlack of information. Defend&ntfurtherdenies Paragraph 
8 on the basis that the averments set forth in Paragraph 8 are compound and that any and 
all documents referred to in Paragraph 8 speak for themselves. 
9. Defendant denies for lack of information, 
06.04240e.RWH.WPD 2 SWAN 136 
10. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
11. Defendant denies for lack of information, 
12. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
13. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
14. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
15. Defendant denies for lack of information. Defendant further denies on the 
basis that the averments set forth in Paragraph 15 are compound. 
16. Defendant incorporates by reference the defensjes contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
17. Defendant denies on the basis that the Li^ns speak for themselves. 
Defendant further denies for lack of information, 
18. Defendant denies on the basis that the avermelnts set forth in Paragraph 18 
call for a legal conclusion. Defendant further denies for lack! of information. 
19. Defendant denies on the basis that the averments in Paragraph 19 are 
compound. Defendant further denies on the basis that the averments set forth in 
Paragraph 19 call for a legal conclusion. Defendant additionally denies for lack of 
information. 
20. Defendant denies on the basis that the averments in Paragraph 20 are 
compound. Defendant further denies on the basis that {he averments set forth in 
Paragraph 20 call for a lega! conclusion. Defendant additionally denies for lack of 
information. 
08.042406 *WHWPD 3 SWAN I3e 
21. Defendant denies on the basis that the averments in Paragraph 21 are 
compound. Defendant further denies on the basis that the averments set forth in 
Paragraph 21 call for a legal conclusion. Defendant additionally denies for lack of 
information. 
CLAIM TWO: BREACH OF CONTRACT 
22. Defendant incorporates by reference the defences contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
23. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
CLAIM THREE: UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
24. Defendant incorporates by reference the defenses contained in the preceding 
paragraphs. 
25. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
26. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
27. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
28. Defendant denies on the basis that the averments in Paragraph 28 are 
compound. Defendant further denies on the basis that the averments set forth in 
Paragraph 28 call for a legal conclusion, Defendant additionally denies for lack of 
information. 
29. Defendant denies for lack of information. 
30. Defendant denies for lack of information, 
06.042406 RWH.WPD 4 SWAN 136 
31. Defendant denies each and every averment set forth in Plaintiffs Amended 
Complaint that Defendant has not expressly admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
As an affirmative defense, Defendant alleges that tl(ie priority of the lien claims 
should be determined by the Court. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
There are or may be other affirmative defenses whicli Defendant is unaware of at 
this time which may be applicable to this lawsuit. Defendant specifically reserves the right 
to amend its Answer to include those defenses once tlheir applicability has been 
determined. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiffs Amended Complaint, Defendant 
prays that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be dismissed, thai Defendant be awarded its 
costs incurred herein, and for such other and further relief a$ the Court deems just and 
equitable. 
DATED this _-JQ day of June, 2006. 
RICHER & OyERHOLT, P.C. 
ArnohrRicher ' 
Attorney for Defendant 
06.0424D6.RWH.WPD 5 SWAN 13G 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e 3 o day of June, 2006,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
RONALD ADY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^X 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
VICTOR PLASTERING, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
CHRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA COLLINS, 
COBALT HOMES, INC. Dba COBALT 
HOMES STYLE BUILDER & COBALT 
HOMES THE CEDARS L.L.C. dba 
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDERS, 
BRIAN K. BRADY, MASCO 
CONTRACTORS SERVICES, DIRECT 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, 
CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING 
MATERIALS, INC., DAVE'S QUALITY 
ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK FEDERAL 
SAVINGS BANK and JOHN DOES 1 
through 10, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM RULING 
Date: May 9, 2007 
Case No. 040401255 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Division 2 
This matter comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs motion to strike the Affidavits of 
Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech; Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on Defendant Citibank and 
Citimortgage's motion for summary judgment; and Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on 
Defendant Swanson 's motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On January 16, 2007, this Court issued a memorandum decision granting defendants 
CitiMortgage and Citibank Federal Savings Bank's unopposed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. This Court found that because Plaintiffs failed to file a lis pendens in this 
1 
matter and to name Defendants as parties to this lawsuit within 180 days of Plaintiff s 
notice of claim of lien, and because Defendants had no actual knowledge of the lawsuit 
prior to June 2006 (within the 180 day statutory period), the lien was void as to the 
Defendants CitiMortgage and Citibank. 
2. On February 15, 2007, this Court granted defendant Swanson Building Material, Inc.'s 
Motion for Summary Judgment based on the fact that Plaintiff did not name Swanson in 
its initial complaint and failed to do so until nearly two years after recording notice of its 
claim of lien and also because that Plaintiff had failed to meet its statutory burden to 
prove that Swanson had actual knowledge of the lawsuit during the relevant time frame. 
DISCUSSION 
In regard to Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendants CitiMortgage and 
Citibank ("Citi-Defendants"), Plaintiff argues that the Court erred in granting summary judgment 
because the Citi-Defendants provided defective affidavits that are inadmissible that would 
preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff did not oppose the affidavits or the summary judgment 
until the current motion, after summary judgment had already been awarded. 
Plaintiff argues that in the affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim Beech, do not show how 
Beech or Flynn were qualified to aver that they knew that the officers and agents of rheir 
respective businesses had no knowledge of the current litigation. 
Affidavits must meet the standards as set forth in Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 56(e) states that affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth 
2 £01 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
In the affidavit of Jim Beech, he swears that he is the president of Direct Mortgage 
Corporation and that he first learned of the existence and pendency of the current litigation at the 
time Direct Mortgage Corporation was served process on June 14, 2006. He further swears, that 
neither he or any other officer or agent of Direct Mortgage Corporation had actual knowledge of 
the existence of the current litigation until June 14, 2006. 
Plaintiff argues that in the case of K&T, Inc. v. Korouhs. 888 P. 2d 623 (Utah 1994), the 
Court found improper a Trial Court's consideration of an affidavit of a secretary on a summary 
judgment where he stated the affidavit in that case of a secretary who claimed that to the best of 
his knowledge neither he nor anyone at his company had actual knowledge of the Consent 
Agreement or the Stockholder's Agreement. 
However, Citi-Defendants argue and this Court agrees that on a motion for summary 
judgment when an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits, he is deemed to 
have waived his opposition to whatever evidentiary defects may exist. See Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Development Company, 659 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1983). Because Plaintiff failed to 
move to strike defective affidavits on summary judgment they were waived by Plaintiff and were 
properly considered by the Court. 
Rule 56(e) clearly states: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this 
Rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this Rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial If he 
does not respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Because Plaintiff did not object to the affidavits any evidentiary defects are deemed 
waived and the Court takes the affidavits as undisputed fact. Under Rule 56(e) where there is no 
genuine issues of fact that any officer or agent of the Citi-Defendants had knowledge of this 
current litigation, this Court properly granted summary judgment to the Citi-Defendants. 
Therefore, based on the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs motion for a new trial on the Citi 
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied. Because the Plaintiff did not move to 
strike the affidavits on motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff may not move to strike the 
affidavits post-judgment, so the Plaintiffs motion to strike affidavits of Wayne Flynn and Jim 
Beech is also denied. 
In regard to Swanson, this Court finds that Swanson was not sent the ruling that was 
issued by the Court on February 15, 2007. This Court finds that Swanson made a good faith 
effort to see if a ruling had been issued when Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial against 
Defendant Swanson, by checking the Court docket. Therefore under Rule 6(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure this Court allows and considers Swanson's second memorandum in 
opposition to Plaintiffs motion. 
In Plaintiffs motion for a new trial against Defendant Swanson, Plaintiff argues 5 points: 
1) There is no evidence to support the Court's finding that the defendant Swanson was an 
4 
interested party; 2) The Court erred in ruling that the lapse of the Defendant Swanson's lien was 
immaterial to the summary judgment issues before this Court; 3) The Court erred in ruling that 
Defendant Swanson's failure to plead the statute of limitation did not result in a waiver of that 
defense; 4) The Court erred in ruling that the Plaintiffs failure to file a lis pendens within 180 
days of the filing of the mechanic's lien is jurisdictional as opposed to failure to file a legal 
action on the lien within 180 days and; 5) The Court erred in law in reversing the burden of 
production in a summary judgment proceeding requiring the Plaintiff rather than Swanson to 
dispose of the material issue of fact as to whether Swanson had actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the within action. 
On February 3, 2006, Plaintiff amended their complaint stating that all Defendants, "hold 
some claim of right, title, or interest to the aforementioned property and PLAINTIFF alleges that 
all of the claims of right, title or interest of each of theses Defendants and all persons claiming 
by, through, or under them, are junior, inferior, and subject to the prior claims and interest of 
PLAINTIFF, or that the claims, if any, of any other person or entity (Doe Defendants) who may 
assert an interest in the properties should be litigated herein and priorities established." Under 
Baldwin v. Vanatage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984), "An admission of fact in a pleading 
is a judicial admission and is nonnally conclusive on the party making it/' This Court finds that 
Plaintiff sued Swanson and Plaintiff cannot claim now that Swanson has no interest and standing 
and cannot respond to the complaint. For the same reasons this Court finds it immaterial that 
Swanson's prior lien has lapsed. 
5 
Plaintiff also asserts that because Swanson did not assert the statute of limitations of the 
lien in its answer that Swanson waived its statute of limitations defense. However, this Court 
finds that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case. 
A party failing to comply with §38-1-11 of the mechanics' lien statute is not subject to 
waiver, but is jurisdictional. See Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 
P.2d 738 (1990). 
This Court stands by its two prior rulings. The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to show 
that the Plaintiff is entitled to the lien and has complied with the lien statute §38-1-11. Both Citi-
Defendants and Swanson filed motions for summary judgment based on the fact that they did not 
have actual knowledge of the current litigation or the lien and that the amended complaint 
naming the Defendants was filed 180 days after the lien was filed. Defendants Swanson and 
Citi-Defendants filed unopposed affidavits stating that no officers or agents at the respective 
businesses had any knowledge of the current litigation. Defendants did not have to prove that 
they had an interest in the property as Plaintiff brought the Defendants into the lawsuit creating 
an affirmative interest. 
Plaintiff attempts to object to the affidavits post-judgment, but that right to objection has 
been waived. Based on the above facts the motion for a new trial with Defendant Swanson is 
denied. 
Defendants to prepare an order consistent with this ruling. 
2 DATED this _ 7 _ day of May, 2007. 
Steven L. Hansen 
District Court Judge 
Case No. 040401255 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I served a true and exact copy of the foregoing by mail, postage 
prepaid, on the _^L day of May, 2007, to the following: 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Ronald Ady 
8 East Broadway, Ste. 710 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant Swanson 
Arnold Richer 
Darci D. Tolbert 
Robert W. Harrow 
RICHER & OVERHOLT P.C. 
901 West Baker Drive 
South Jordan, Utah 84095 
Attorneys for Defendant Citimortgage, Inc and Citibank Federal Savings Bank 
Leslie Van Frank 
Matthew G. Bagley 
CHONE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL P.C. 
257 East 200 South, 7th floor 
PO Box 11008 
TV Ay-^ 
Deputy Court'cierk 
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VICTOR PLASTERING, WC, 
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vs. 
CI-IRIS A. COLLINS, CHANNA 
COLLINS, COBALT HOME5, INGjdba . -i 
COBALT HOMES STYLE BUILDER ;& i 
COBALT HOMES THE €EDARS;,jjjO D^ej 
LX.C. dba COBALT HOMES STYjIiE:' • . ] 
BUILDERS, BRIAN K. BRADY, MASCO G a^e'l 
CONTRACTORS SERVICER, DlRE'CT ':! 
MORTGAGE CORPORATION, Divici 
CONSTRUCTION PRODUCTS 
COMPANY, SWANSON BUILDING': \ 
MATERIALS, INC, DAVE'S QUAIL'LTY. 
ROOFING, INC., CITIBANK EEDEfe&L 
SAYINGS BANK and JOHN DOEgf 
through 10, 
Defendants: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
February 15, 2007 
No. 040401255 
|on H: Judge Steven L, Hansen 
This matter comes before the coiuiit on Defendaiit Swanaon Building; Materials, Lnc.Js 
("Swanson") Motion for Summar)> Judgment. Having [ijj|viewed the file in this matter and for the 
reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motiop for [Sifmrijqy Judgment is granted. 
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STATEMENT OF U^WSPUTBl) MATERIAL FACTS 
1 Plaintiff is a stucco contractor with whom Defendant Cobalt Homes, Inc , entered into a 
contiact under which Plaintiff was! to comtrucji certain improvements to real property 
owned by Defendants Chris and Channa Colling 
2. Plaintiff recorded its Notice of Clfrmi of Lien ,'nnlthe subject property with the Utah 
County Recorder's Office on /anti'ary J4, iiUUff. plaintiff recorded Amended Notices of 
Lien on April 13, 2004. 
3 Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this matter on ]Vpril 13, 2004, in which Defendant 
II 
Swanson was not named as a Defendam, 
A Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on Pebri^ry 10, 2006. 
5, Defendant Swanson was first named as a Defendant in Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. 
ii i i 
6. Defendant Swanson was not served process in jljjs matter until June 22, 2006. 
U 7. There is no evidence in the reco™ indicating 
lawsuit pending in this matter nnl il il WLi, ser 
h$ Defendant had actual knowledge of the 
'ed process on June 22, 2006, 
IpISCUSSION 
aA summary judgment is appropriate only whore the favored party makes a showing 
ii 1 1 
which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the losing party,' Tannei v. 
Utah Poultry & Fanners Co-op, 359 P.2d 18, 19 [Utah 1961). Additionally, uthe facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the liglit most favoiable to the 
rjonmoving party. . .a> Jackson y, Matei)$9 70 P.3d 7|fc>, SO (Utah 2003), 
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A lien claimant must file notice of the pendency of action within 1 SO days from the date 
on which the claimant filed a notice of claim with, the annronriate county recorder. UT Code 
Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)-{2). Failure to do so renders the.ilieir/void "except.as to persons who have 
been made parties to the action and personsTia.ymg actual knowledge of the commencement of 
the action. UT Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(2)(a.);. Thus, an intprested. party is not subject, to hen where 
lis pendens is not timely filed and the pai'ty iiaano leuowfieage of the lawsuit during the relevant 
time frame. Projects Unlimited, Inc. v, Capper State Tjipft & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 751 
(Utah 1990). 
The Court finds irrelevant Plaintiffs oiaimsvfhat'because Defendant may have had alien 
against the subject property which it hasmot litigated and has since expired, thai Defendant is a 
stranger to this action and has no staridingjlp seek affirmative relief, The Court finds further 
unpersuasive Plaintiffs argument thatDeienoam warveet an. affirmative defense of untimely 
action by failing to plead it in its responsive pleading, On tire contrary, the Court: finds that an 
untimely action under the mechanics' Heni'Slai/ate isjnot:Subject to waiver, but is jurisdictional. 
Projects Unlimited Inc., 798 P.2d at 290-291. 
Even when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes 
that Defendant is entitled to summary J ^ ^ ^ L
 Wl3.a ^ H - ^ uf law. Although Plaintiff filed an 
action to enforce the lien (its Complaint) witlim ISO.days of recording it, Plaintiff failed to name 
Swanson as a Defendant hi its initial Complaint, arid, iryfact, failed to do so until nearly two 
years after recording notice of its claim officii. -.Further;'the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed 
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to meet its statutory burden to show that Defendant had'actual knowledge of the lawsuit during 
the relevant time frame, Utah Code Ann. § ^ 8-141(2)00 Thus, the Court concludes that 
Plaintiffs lien is void as to Defendant Swanson. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defepdants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
with reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18(1). Defendant is 
to prepare an order consistent with this decision, 
Dated this /k day of February, '2(j)Q7 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page, Case No. 040401255 
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^ I hereby certify that, on the /£? ' day of February, 2007,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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Ronald Ady 
8 East Broadway, Suite 710 
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Counsel for the Defendants: 
Alan F. Mecham 
68 South Main Street, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Leslie Van Frank 
Matthew G Bagley 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C 
257 East 200 South, 7lh Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Stephen C. Tingey 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER, £.C 
P.O Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
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Pago 5 of 5 
